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Serial Default and the “Paradox” of Rich-to-Poor Capital Flows
By CARMEN M. REINHART AND KENNETH S. ROGOFF*
Lightning may never strike twice in the same
place, but the same cannot be said of sovereign
default. Throughout history, governments have
demonstrated that “serial default” is the rule,
not the exception. Argentina has famously de-
faulted on ﬁve occasions since its birth in the
1820’s. However, as shown in Table 1, Argen-
tina’s record is surpassed by many countries in
the New World (Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Ven-
ezuela, and Ecuador) and by almost as many in
the Old World (France, Germany, Portugal,
Spain, and Turkey).
1 At the same time, a
smaller and dwindling number of developing
countries such as India, Korea, Malaysia, Mau-
ritius, Singapore, and Thailand have yet to de-
fault, despite being tested by severe turmoil,
including the Asian crisis of the late 1990’s.
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What can explain such striking differences in
default performance? State-of-the-art theoreti-
cal models of debt crises stress the importance
of multiple equilibria where random investor
panics can become self-fulﬁlling. The implica-
tion is that economists may never be able to
precisely explain sovereign defaults, much less
predict them. Nevertheless, the fact that sover-
eign defaults tend to recur like clockwork in
some countries, while being absent in others,
suggests that there must be a signiﬁcant explain-
able component as well.
In this paper, we begin by brieﬂy examining
the history and incidence of serial default. We
then review some of the explanations offered in
the literature on the “paradox” of why capital
does not ﬂow from rich to poor countries and
link this question to sovereigns countries’ credit
track records. There is no doubt that there are
many reasons why capital does not ﬂow from
rich to poor nations and that some of these
reasons are subtle, difﬁcult to model, and even
more difﬁcult to quantify. Yet the evidence we
present here, which draws heavily on the earlier
work of Reinhart et al. (2003), suggests that
some explanations may be more relevant than
others. In the end, the true paradox may not be
that too little capital ﬂows from the wealthy to
the poor nations, but that in uneven bouts and
volatile cycles, too much capital (speciﬁcally in
the form of debt) is channeled to “debt-intolerant”
serial defaulters. Government and government-
guaranteed external debt is typically, though not
always, the main locus of problems. We offer
some concluding reﬂections on what debt intol-
erance implies for safe debt thresholds in devel-
oping countries that are aspiring to graduate
from their developing status.
I. Serial Default in Historical Perspective
Today’s developing countries did not invent
sovereign default, nor did they invent serial
default. As shown in Table 1, France and Ger-
many have each defaulted eight times since
1500 (a factor one does not see emphasized in
today’s discussions of what a good match these
countries are for a currency union). The Russian
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1 Standard & Poor’s deﬁnes sovereign default as the
failure of an obligor to meet a principal or interest payment
on the due date (or within the speciﬁed grace period) con-
tained in the original terms of the debt issue. A debt re-
structuring where the new debt contains less favorable terms
than the original issue is also counted as default. For 1800
to the present, this is the deﬁnition of default used to
construct Table 1.
2 Indonesia and Pakistan, with no prior history of default,
joined the ranks of “defaulters” in the late 1990’s.
53post-communist default of 1998 rocked the
world, as did Russia’s post-Tsarist default early
in the 20th century. But Russia’s two famous
defaults should not have come as a complete
shock: The country had already defaulted twice
previously. The all-time post-1500 record-
holder, however, appears to be Spain, which has
clocked a remarkable 13 defaults.
Reinhart et al. (2003) ﬁnd that a country’s
history of default on external debt, together with
its inﬂation history (which effectively proxies
for a government’s record of real repayment on
internal obligations), provides a good measure
of a country’s capacity to bear debt without
brooking high risk of default. They ﬁnd that
countries can graduate from being serial de-
faulters as, say, Greece has in recent decades.
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The process of “graduation,” however, is sel-
dom accomplished in a short time frame. De-
fault exacerbates weak political institutions,
laying the seeds for further defaults later down
the road. Their evidence also suggests that the
ﬁrst default may be much more costly than later
ones. Thus, whereas countries may go to great
lengths to avoid a ﬁrst or perhaps second de-
fault, serial defaulters (who have less of a rep-
utation to lose) face a different calculus. To
graduate to developed-country status, serial de-
faulters’ main concern should be in achieving
and sustaining markedly lower debt burdens, a
transition that is seldom accomplished solely
through high growth and debt repayments. Nev-
ertheless, it is notable that one-time serial de-
faulter Chile, is showing early signs of having
“graduated” in no small part by reducing exter-
nal debt from 134 percent of GNP in 1985 to
about of 30 percent 12 years later. This sharply
contrasts the external debt ratios of 50 percent
(or higher) for many of the serial defaulters
shown in Table 1.
II. Rich to Poor Capital Flows: Alternative
Explanations
It is interesting to use the evidence on serial
default to reexamine a broader debate in the
growth literature on why countries do not seem
to converge more rapidly in per capita income.
In a much-cited paper presented at the Ameri-
can Economic Association meetings a decade
and half ago, Robert Lucas (1990) argued that it
was a puzzle that more capital does not ﬂow
from rich countries to poor countries, given
back-of-the-envelope calculations suggesting
massive differences in physical rates of return in
favor of capital-poor countries. Lucas rejected
the standard explanation of expropriation risk,
pointing to the fact that before World War II
many of today’s developing countries were col-
onies and subject to rich-country laws. He ar-
gued that paucity of capital ﬂows to poor
countries must instead be rooted in more fun-
damental economic forces, such as externalities
in human-capital formation favoring further in-
vestment in already capital-rich countries.
Lucas’s “new growth theory” explanation
stands in interesting contrast to other theories of
the same phenomenon, generally emphasizing
credit-market imperfections. These include the
seminal reputation and debt model of Jonathan
Eaton and Mark Gersovitz (1981), the legal-
3 Greece’s foreign-currency bond debt was in default
status until 1964.
TABLE 1—SELECTED CASES OF SERIAL DEFAULT IN THE
OLD AND NEW “EMERGING MARKETS”: 1501–2002
Country
Number of default (or restructuring)
episodes
1501–1800 1801–1900 1901–2002 Total
Spain 6 7 0 13
Ecuador n.a. 3 6 9
Venezuela n.a. 5 4 9
France 8 n.a. 0 8
Germany 1 5 2 8
Mexico n.a. 5 3 8
Uruguay n.a. 2 6 8
Brazil n.a. 2 5 7
Colombia n.a. 4 3 7
Liberia n.a. 1 6 7
Peru n.a. 2 5 7
Turkey/Ottoman
Empire
n.a. 1 6 7
Portugal 1 5 0 6
Argentina n.a. 2 3 5
Austria n.a. 1 4 5
Bulgaria n.a. 2 3 5
Greece n.a. 4 1 5
Yugoslavia
(former)
n.a. 1 4 5
Chile n.a. 2 2 4
Russia n.a. 1 3 4
Poland n.a. n.a. 3 3
China n.a. n.a. 2 2
Egypt n.a. 1 1 2
Sources: Reinhart et al. (2003) and sources cited therein and
Standard and Poor’s Credit Week, various issues.
54 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2004sanctions-based bargaining framework of
Jeremy Bulow and Rogoff (1989), and the
domestic-institutions-based framework of Laura
Alfaro et al. (2003). These alternative explana-
tions (which can be interpreted as variants of
expropriation risk) rely on weak contract en-
forcement preventing the full blossoming of
international capital markets needed to accom-
modate ﬁnancial ﬂows that, otherwise, would
go to developing countries with higher marginal
products of capital. Somewhere in between
these explanations and the human-capital exter-
nalities model of Lucas is the framework ad-
vanced in Mark Gertler and Rogoff (1989,
1990). Gertler and Rogoff show that, even
where lending contracts can be enforced per-
fectly across borders, regions with higher
wealth will suffer less from innate credit-market
imperfections thanks to the ability of entrepre-
neurs to rely more on self-ﬁnance. Gertler and
Rogoff illustrate how, in principle, it is possible
for these endogenously determined credit-
market imperfections to cause net capital ﬂows
to go from poor to rich, even with identical
technologies and identical institutions for con-
tract enforcement.
III. Evidence
What is the evidence on these alternative
views? Lucas (1990) dismisses the political risk
factor using the example of India. Prior to 1945,
India was subject to British rule, and yet the
capital–labor ratio in India remained far below
that of Britain. For the colonial period, one
answer might be that the penetration of British
law and institutions into distant India might
have been far from perfect, with local culture
and customs playing a large role. Therefore,
British investors by no means regarded an in-
vestment in rural India to be as easy to monitor
or enforce as an investment in land south of
London. Moreover, the record of rebellion
while a British colony probably implied that the
ex ante risk of expropriation was greater than
the ex post one. (Perhaps an even more obvious
example would be colonial Ireland, which
would not have presented itself as a particularly
attractive investment opportunity given its
many rebellions.) Following independence, In-
dia chose a very autarkic development strategy
until the 1990’s, sharply limiting the inﬂow of
foreign goods and capital. To date, a myriad of
capital controls remain ﬁrmly in place.
It is plausible, of course, that even if political
risk does compromise the rights of both external
and internal creditors, rates-of-return differen-
tials may be so large as to swamp this concern,
and funds should still ﬂow in large quantities
from rich to poor countries. We do not take up
this issue here, though a growing literature
points to a number of factors, other than human-
capital externalities, that would mute return
differentials. One simple point is that in a multi-
good world, trade in commodities will tend to
reduce differences in rates of return to capital
and potentially even eliminate them; this is sim-
ply Samuelson’s classic factor-price equaliza-
tion theorem (see Maurice Obstfeld and Rogoff
[1996], among others). Also, as Pierre Olivier
Gourinchas and Olivier Jeanne (2003) recently
quantify, domestic institutional factors may
swamp differences in capital–labor ratios in
explaining cross-country output-per-capita dif-
ferentials in an extended Solow model. Human-
capital externalities may also be important, but
the positive evidence that they are central in
explaining cross-country income differentials
seems scant (see e.g., Elhanan Helpman, 2004).
There is arguably more positive evidence in
favor of the poor–rich capital-ﬂow model of
Gertler and Rogoff (1989, 1990). Figure
1 shows that private lending to developing
countries rises more than percent for percent
with per capita income among poor developing
countries, a prediction of their model corrobo-
rated by Philip Lane (2003), who attempts to
deal with exogeneity issues by using standard
FIGURE 1. PRIVATE LENDING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
PLOTTED AGAINST PER CAPITA INCOME
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physical rates of return.
In our view, however, there is much more
evidence pointing to the primal role of political
and credit-market risk. For example, Alfaro et
al. (2003) present evidence for equity and direct
foreign investment that parallels that shown for
private lending in Figure 1. Extending Lane
(2003), their cross-country regressions suggest
that the principal driving factor is differences in
the quality of institutions, including prevalence
of corruption. As Table 2 illustrates, only 12
percent of low-income countries issued any eq-
uity at all during 1983–2003, and only a third of
middle-income countries did so—a contrast to
the fact that all the OECD countries issued
equity. Indeed, the high-income countries ac-
counted for 90 percent of the value of all equi-
ties issued in that period. Given the high risk
faced by developing countries due to factors
such as volatile weather and commodity prices
(and therefore the huge potential gains to diver-
siﬁcation), this fact is hardly consistent with the
notion that institutions and enforcement tech-
nologies are not a problem. Indeed, outside the
roughly 25 “emerging markets” that account for
the bulk of ﬁnancial ﬂows from the rich, the
remaining developing countries receive funds
mainly through aid and direct foreign invest-
ment, the latter typically being the most difﬁcult
to expropriate due to the importance of foreign
investor technology.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that
credit markets are the central problem, however,
comes from returning to our theme of serial
default. Figure 2 plots the percentage of total
years in default since 1946 (or since indepen-
dence, whichever comes later), on the vertical
axis, versus per capita income (1998–2002 av-
erage) on the horizontal axis. As the ﬁgure
illustrates, there is a remarkable correlation,
with the poorest countries often in default one-
third to one-half the time despite having bor-
rowed very little; many African countries ﬁt this
mold, for example. As Table 3 shows, the data
neatly ﬁt a logistic curve.
4 No wonder ﬂows are
so small!
Thus, the key explanation to the “paradox” of
why so little capital ﬂows to poor countries may
be quite simple: Countries that do not repay
4 The logistic function is an obvious choice given that
the dependent variable (share of years in default) is bounded
between 0 and 1 and that theoretical models stress multiple
equilibria and signiﬁcant nonlinearities.
TABLE 2—GROSS INTERNATIONAL EQUITY ISSUES
BY INCOME LEVEL:T OTALS, 1983–2003
Measure
Middle to:
Low
Low
[ex. China] High
High
[OECD]
Bank of International
Settlements
Billions of U.S. dollars 19.5 89.5 40.1 1,314.3
[33.4] [1,215.4]
Percentage of total 1.3 6.1 2.8 89.8
issued [2.3] [83.1]
Percentage of countries 4.5 19.2 15.4 55.4
issuing equities [100.0]
Bank of International
Settlements,
Deologic data
Percentage of countries 12.1 34.6 38.5 60.7
issuing equities [100.0]
Number of countries in 66 52 39 56
income categories [24]
Notes: The classiﬁcation of countries by level of income is
taken from the World Bank. The more comprehensive
pooled data uses the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS) data for those reported by the BIS and Dealogic data
for all other countries. The dollar ﬁgures and the distribution
across income groups are only marginally affected when
countries covered by Dealogic but not by the BIS are
included in the totals, as the former is only adding the
smaller issues.
Sources: Bank of International Settlements (table 18), Deo-
logic, World Bank (Global Development Finance), and au-
thors’ calculations.
FIGURE 2. SHARE OF YEARS IN DEFAULT AND INCOME
LEVELS
Notes: If the country gained its independence after 1946, we
calculate the shares for the post-independence period.
Sources: International Monetary Fund World Economic
Outlook (various issues), Reinhart et al. (2003) and sources
cited therein.
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rowing from the rest of the world. The fact that
so many poor countries are in default on their
debts, that so little funds are channeled through
equity, and that overall private lending rises
more than proportionally with wealth, all
strongly support the view that credit markets
and political risk are the main reasons why we
do not see more capital ﬂows to developing
countries. If credit-market imperfections abate
over time due to better institutions, then human-
capital externalities or other “new growth” ele-
ments may come to play a larger role. But as
long as the odds of non-repayment are as high
as 65 percent for some low-income countries,
credit risk seems like a far more compelling
reason for the paucity of rich–poor capital ﬂows.
IV. Policy Implications
We have argued here (as in Reinhart et al.,
2003) that the pervasive phenomenon of serial
default and the costs such defaults entail suggest
that emerging-market countries may need to
aim for far lower levels of external debt-to-GDP
than what has been conventionally considered
prudent. Indeed, prudent external-debt thresh-
olds may be closer to 15–30 percent (the level
seen in several of the emerging-market non-
defaulters) than the much higher levels today
one sees in countries with a history of serial
default, such as Turkey and Brazil. As far as
emerging markets are concerned, comparisons
to the lofty debt ratios some wealthy countries
carry are irrelevant, and governments in devel-
oping countries who disregard this difference in
debt tolerance are only likely to propagate the
serial-default syndrome. Indeed, if anything, net
external-debt thresholds may have to become
more conservative to accommodate the sharp
rise seen in many countries’ domestic public
debt. For instance, domestic government debt as
a percentage of GDP in India, Korea, and Thai-
land was in single digits in the early 1980’s, and
by the late 1990’s it had risen to 86, 63, and 76
percent, respectively, making these countries’
reserve accumulation more understandable.
There is also a case for having rich countries
make it more difﬁcult, not less, to enforce sov-
ereign debt contracts in rich-country courts, as
Bulow and Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff (1999)
suggest (see also Andrei Shleifer, 2003). Though
this would almost certainly reduce debt ﬂows to
many countries in the short run, it would lead to a
strengthening of the international ﬁnancial system
in the long run, reducing reliance on debt and
helping support the evolution of greater ﬂows in
equity and direct foreign investment.
In sum, the remarkable history of serial de-
fault suggests that there is no puzzle as to why
capital does not ﬂow in greater quantities from
rich to poor. Rather, the real problem is how to
prevent too much capital from ﬂowing to serial
defaulters (and especially their governments)
before they have “graduated” out of that state.
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